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Abstract 
/ŶĂĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨ ?ŚĂƌĚĞŶŝŶŐ ?ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐďĞŶĞĨŝƚĐůĂŝŵĂŶƚƐŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŽŵĞĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚƐŽĐŝĂů
ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĐĂŶŽŶůǇďĞƌĞďƵŝůƚǁŚĞŶ ?ďĞŶĞĨŝƚŵǇƚŚƐ ?ĂŶĚŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐĂƌĞƚĂĐŬůĞĚ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚŝƐ
paper argues that some of these concerns are misplaced, based on evidence on (i) the extent of 
myths; (ii) the effectiveness of mythbusting; and (iii) the existence of myths/negative attitudes in 
times/places the benefits system is more popular. It argues that public attitudes are fundamentally 
characterised by ambivalence, and the critical issue is the balance between positive and negative 
aspects and which of these are triggered in public debate. 
  
Introduction 
>ĂďŽƵƌ ?ƐĚĞĨĞĂƚŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ƌŝƚŝƐŚ'ĞŶĞƌĂůůĞĐƚŝon can be explained by a great many factors, as the 
official post-ŵŽƌƚĞŵ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ĞĐŬĞƚƚƌĞƉŽƌƚ ? ?ŵĂŬĞƐĐůĞĂƌ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ǁŚĞŶƚŚĞĞĐŬĞƚƚƌĞƉŽƌƚǁĂƐ
published, the headlines in the left-ǁŝŶŐŶĞǁƐƉĂƉĞƌƐĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚůǇƐĞƚƚůĞĚŽŶƚŚĞƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐůĂĐŬŽĨƚƌƵƐƚ
by the ƉƵďůŝĐŽŶ ‘ǁĞůĨĂƌĞ ?ĂƐĂŬĞǇĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌƚŚĞŝƌĚŝƐŵĂůĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶƌĞƐƵůƚ ?ĂůŽŶŐƐŝĚĞƉĂƌĂůůĞů
concerns about the economy and immigration).1  This reflects a much wider preoccupation on the 
British left in recent years (not just within the Labour Party) about how to respond to public 
attitudes towards the benefits system, which are generally perceived to be both harsh and based on 
 ‘ŵǇƚŚƐ ?ĨƵĞůůĞĚďǇƉŽůŝƚŝĐŝĂŶƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŵĞĚŝĂ ?ůĞĂǀŝŶŐƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůůǇĂƚŽĚĚƐǁŝƚŚůĞĨƚ-wing 
values (e.g. Hills, 2014; Horton & Gregory, 2009; Taylor-Gooby, 2015). This potentially leaves 
progressives with a choice of either tƌǇŝŶŐƚŽĐŽƌƌĞĐƚƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƐŵǇƚŚƐ ?ŽƌƐŝŵƉůǇĂĐĐŽŵŵŽĚĂƚŝŶŐ
their policy agenda to a view of the world that they do not share. 
In this paper, however, I want to argue that some of these concerns are misplaced, bringing together 
several different pieces of empirical evidence that have not previously been integrated. To be 
absolutely clear: the British public do believe myths, and they are also more negative about benefit 
ĐůĂŝŵĂŶƚƐƚŚĂŶƚŚĞǇƵƐĞĚƚŽďĞ ?ĂƐ/ǁŝůůƐŚŽǁ ?zĞƚƚŚŝƐĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŵĞĂŶƚŚĂƚ ‘ŵǇƚŚďƵƐƚŝŶŐ ?ŝƐƚŚĞďĞƐƚ
way of getting public support for progressive benefit reforms. While myths are associated with 
negative perceptions of claimants, evidence suggest mythbusting is unlikely to change this. 
Moreover, such attitudes are not what primarily sets us apart from times and places where there is 
more public support for the benefits system. Instead, what is crucial is how far the public focus on 
the positive consequences of the benefits system, and how much we focus on the (widely-perceived) 
positive vs. negative consequences in our public debates.  
Myths and deservingness judgements in 21st-century Britain 
There are two parts to the prevailing view of British benefit attitudes. Firstly, the idea that public 
attitudes have become more hostile is, as Hudson and Lunt (in press) put it,  “ŶŽǁĐůŽƐĞƚŽĂŶ
ŽƌƚŚŽĚŽǆǀŝĞǁ ? ? This is hardly surprising in the face of newspaper headlines that have regularly 
ƉƌŽĐůĂŝŵĞĚƚŚĂƚĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐďĞŶĞĨŝƚĐůĂŝŵĂŶƚƐĂƌĞ ‘ŚĂƌĚĞŶŝŶŐ ? ?ŽĨƚĞŶďĂƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞůĂƚĞƐƚ
launch of the British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey.2  And this consensus is not completely divorced 
from the empirical reality: attitudes towards unemployment benefit claimants have definitely 
hardened, and noticeably fewer people believe that the government should spend ŵŽƌĞŽŶ ‘ǁĞůĨĂƌĞ
ďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐĨŽƌƚŚĞƉŽŽƌ ?(Clery, 2012; Taylor & Taylor-Gooby, 2015), as illustrated in Figure 1 below.   
Yet the existence of this decline can blind us to the nuances of shifts in public opinion. Comparing 
ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚǀŝĞǁƐƚŽƚŚĞůĂƚĞ ? ? ? ?Ɛ ?ƚŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌƐƐĂǇŝŶŐƚŚĂ  ‘ŵŽƐƚƉĞŽƉůĞŽŶƚŚĞĚŽůĞĂƌĞĨŝĚĚůŝŶŐŝŶŽŶĞ
ǁĂǇŽƌĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?ŽƌƚŚĂƚ ‘ŵĂŶǇƉĞŽƉůĞǁŚŽŐĞƚ ƐŽĐŝĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĚŽŶ ?ƚƌĞĂůůǇĚĞƐĞƌǀĞĂŶǇŚĞůƉ ?ŚĂƐ





2 See http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2009/02/hardening-attitudes-towards-welfare-make-reform-an-easier-sell/, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-21716638, and 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/labour/10055079/Labour-voters-harden-their-hearts-against-
welfare.html   
barely risen (Taylor & Taylor-Gooby, 2015), as also shown in Figure 1. Moreover, it is still the case  ? 
despite the financial crisis, and despite hardening attitudes to unemployed people  ? that more 
ƉĞŽƉůĞĂŐƌĞĞƚŚĂŶĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐŚŽƵůĚƌĂŝƐĞ ‘ǁĞůĨĂƌĞďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐĨŽƌƚŚĞƉŽŽƌ ?ĞǀĞŶŝĨ
ŝƚŵĞĂŶƐŚŝŐŚĞƌƚĂǆĞƐ ?(see Baumberg, 2014 and below). There is some truth to the idea that 
attitudes to the benefits system have hardened, but the scale and uniformity of these shifts is 
perceived to be greater than the evidence bears out. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
The second part of the prevailing view is that the public do not have an accurate view of the benefits 
ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚďĞůŝĞǀŝŶŐ ‘ŵǇƚŚƐ ?(often argued to be spread by parts of the press; see Baumberg et 
al., 2012). This is not just a view of think-tanks and campaigning organisations, but is also shared by 
notable academics such as John Hills (2014) and Peter Taylor-Gooby (2015).  It is also supported by 
the empirical evidence, if anything even more strongly than increasing hostility towards benefit 
claimants. In a separate paper I systematically reviewed 46 beliefs across 18 datasets, and compared 
these to the best available data on the true picture (Baumberg Geiger, submitted). My overall 
conclusion was that the British public do indeed have low levels of understanding of the benefits 
system, primarily in ways that would seem to imply that claimants are undeserving:  
x People wildly overestimate how much is spent on unemployment benefits compared to 
pensions. They also overestimate other related aspects of unemployment benefits (how 
much claimants without children receive, and the proportion of the population that is 
unemployed).  
x Half the population believe out-of-work benefit claims have risen in the past fifteen years, 
when they have actually fallen noticeably. 
x It is difficult to know the true level of benefit fraud  ? ďƵƚƚŚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĞǆƚĞŶƐŝǀĞ
attempts to estimate the level of probable fraud suggest low levels, and even assuming this 
is a lower bound, the public overestimate fraud compared to any reasonable figure. 
x On almost no measure do more than one-third of individuals give a correct answer (as I 
ĚĞĨŝŶĞŝƚ ?ĂůůŽǁŝŶŐƐŽŵĞƌŽŽŵĨŽƌƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇ ?ƌŽƵŶĚŝŶŐŝŶƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŶƵŵĞƌŝĐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐ ? ? 
Inevitably there are further important nuances here. The public are in fact relatively accurate on 
average when estimating the share of the working-age population who currently claim out-of-work 
benefits (and within this, nearly one in four people provide underestimates rather than 
overestimates). People also tend to underestimate how much certain sorts of claimants receive, 
believing the system is less generous to pensioners and unemployed people with children than it 
really is. And it is important to avoid a false air of absolute certainty around these myths; the true 
ĨŝŐƵƌĞƐĂƌĞŽĨƚĞŶƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ?ĂŶĚƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐďĞůŝĞĨƐĂƌĞŽďƚĂŝŶĞĚĨƌŽŵƐĂŵƉůĞƐƵƌǀĞǇƐ ?ŽĨƚĞŶǁĞď
panels) in which response biases are likely. Still, these nuances do not change the overall picture, in 
which the evidence strongly supports the assumption of widespread myths. 
The role of mythbusting 
While there do seem to be widespread benefit myths, my critique here is the implication that 
 ‘ŵǇƚŚďƵƐƚŝŶŐ ?ŝƐƚŚĞďĞƐƚǁĂǇŽĨŐĞƚƚŝŶŐƉƵďůŝĐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞďĞŶĞĨŝƚƌĞĨŽƌŵƐ ?/ƚŝƐ
important not to construct a straw man here; Hills (2014) and Peter Taylor-Gooby (2015) are not 
naively arguing that mythbusting is the panacea for all public concerns. Yet the need to tackle 
misperceptions is a common theme in progressive debate, and sometimes is central: for example, an 
article in the Guardian newspaper argues that  “ŝƚŝƐƉĞƌŚĂƉƐƚŚŝƐŝŐŶŽƌĂŶĐĞ[of the welfare state] 
which is putting the survival of a safe system of suppŽƌƚĨŽƌƚŚĞƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶĂƚĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůƌŝƐŬ ? 
(Beresford, 2013), while the Independent newspaper contained a headline,  “sŽƚĞƌƐ ?ďƌĂŝŶǁĂƐŚĞĚďǇ
dŽƌǇǁĞůĨĂƌĞŵǇƚŚƐ ? ?ƐĂǇƐŶĞǁƉŽůů ? (Grice, 2013) ?DŽƌĞďƌŽĂĚůǇ ? ‘ŵǇƚŚďƵƐƚĞƌƐ ?ĂƌĞĐŽŵŵŽŶůǇƵƐĞĚ
as an element in campaigning (among many others, see Baptist Union of Great Britain et al., 2013; 
Coote & Lyall, 2013). 
However, mythbusters suffer two sets of problems in changing public attitudes: they may not 
ĐŚĂŶŐĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐďĞůŝĞĨƐ ?ĂŶĚĞǀĞŶŝĨƚŚĞǇĚŽ ?ƚŚĞƐĞĐŚĂŶŐĞƐŝŶďĞůŝĞĨƐŵĂǇŶŽƚƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶĐŚĂŶŐĞƐŝŶ
attitudes. I review the evidence for each of these in turn. 
The impact of mythbusting on factual beliefs  
We might expect that presenting people with the facts will make their beliefs more accurate  ? but 
sadly persuasion is rarely that simple. Partly this is a matter of memory: the familiarity of 
misperceptions may linger even after the detail of their inaccuracy fades (Peter & Koch, 2015). 
Moreover, repeated misperceptions increase the fluency with which we can access the underlying 
idea, which makes the idea seem more credible, pithily summarised by Lakoff (2014) ĂƐ ‘ĚŽŶ ?ƚƚŚŝŶŬ
ŽĨĂŶĞůĞƉŚĂŶƚ ? ?ƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚ ? “it is extremely difficult to return the beliefs of people who have been 
exposed to misinformation to a baseline similar to those of peŽƉůĞǁŚŽǁĞƌĞŶĞǀĞƌĞǆƉŽƐĞĚƚŽŝƚ ? 
(Lewandowsky et al., 2012). It is also a mattĞƌŽĨ ‘ƌĞĂĐƚĂŶĐĞ ? ?ĂŶŝŶƐƚŝŶĐƚŝǀĞďƌŝƐƚůŝŶŐǁŚĞŶďĞŝŶŐƚŽůĚ
what to think (Lewandowsky et al., 2012). For these reasons, it is even possible that mythbusting will 
make our beliefs even less accurate. 
But beyond this, there is also a crucial challenge around credibility. Sometimes a myth will appear to 
be more credible than the truth, ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞ ‘ŵǇƚŚďƵƐƚĞƌ ?ĐŽŵĞƐĨƌŽŵĂŶƵŶƚƌƵƐƚĞĚ
source.  Hence for some right-wing individuals with hostile attitudes to benefit claimants, 
mythbusters by campaigning organisations that they usually distrust are unlikely to be convincing. 
These ŝƐƐƵĞƐĂƌĞŵĂŐŶŝĨŝĞĚǁŚĞŶƚŚĞŵǇƚŚƐĂƌĞƉĂƌƚŽĨĂĐŽŵƉĞůůŝŶŐƐƚŽƌǇŽƌ ‘ĨƌĂŵĞ ?ƚŚĂƚĨŝƚƐǁŝƚŚ
ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐǁŝĚĞƌŵĞŶƚĂůŵŽĚĞůƐ ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƐĂƌĞĚŝƐĞŵďŽĚŝĞĚĂŶĚǁŽƵůĚůĞĂǀĞŐĂƉƐŝŶƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ
understanding of the world. As the influential George Lakoff puts it (2006),  “Ĩacts can be assimilated 
ŝŶƚŽƚŚĞďƌĂŝŶŽŶůǇŝĨƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂĨƌĂŵĞƚŽŵĂŬĞƐĞŶƐĞŽƵƚŽĨƚŚĞŵ ?dŚĞĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞŝƐƚŚĂƚĂƌŐƵŝŶŐ
sŝŵƉůǇŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨĨĂĐƚƐ ?ǁŝůůůŝŬĞůǇĨĂůůŽŶĚĞĂĨĞĂƌƐ ?.   
Theory therefore suggests that mythbusting may either work or backfire  ? and there is now a 
burgeoning literature that seeks to test which way this falls empirically. Much of this stems from 
Nyhan & Reifler (2010), who show that mythbusting can fail or even backfire across several policy 
issues (Iraq, stem cell research, and tax cuts). However, an alternative interpretation of the Nyhan & 
Reifler study is that its attempts to improve knowledge are simply weak and unconvincing; for 
example, in the Iraq story where everyone received an article about a Bush speech on the invasion, 
ƚŚĞ ‘ŵǇƚŚďƵƐƚŝŶŐ ?ǁĂƐĂĨĞǁůŝŶĞƐĂƚƚŚĞďŽƚƚŽŵŽĨƚŚĞĂƌƚŝĐůĞŵĞŶƚŝoning a CIA report documenting 
the absence of WMD.  Other research in the same vein but with various types of mythbusting has 
been more mixed, with some showing similar results (Peter & Koch, 2015) but others finding that 
mythbusting can be effective. For example, newspaper articles that correct misperceptions can 
change beliefs even in the midst of induced emotions and partisan biases (Weeks, 2015). 
When it comes to benefits beliefs themselves, the only relevant experimental study is a recent 
working paper by Barnes et al (2016). dŚĞǇďƵŝůĚƚŚĞŝƌĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞh<'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽƐĞŶĚĂůůƚĂǆƉĂǇĞƌƐĂ ‘ƚĂǆƉĂǇĞƌƌĞĐĞŝƉƚ ?ƐŚŽǁŝŶŐǁŚĂƚƚŚĞŝƌŵŽŶĞǇǁĂƐƐƉĞŶƚŽŶ ? ?/ƚƐŚŽƵůĚ
be noted that the statements themselves have been heavily criticised for being misleading.3) Barnes 
ĞƚĂůĨŝŶĚƚŚĂƚƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨƉƵďůŝĐƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐŝŶŐĞŶĞƌĂůŝŵƉƌŽǀĞƐĂĨƚĞƌƌĞĐĞŝǀŝŶŐƚŚĞ
information, and that people who were encouraged to check the receipt had better knowledge than 
people who did not, although they do not show whether this applies more or less to perceived social 
security spending vs. other spending.  
Other studies using different designs on different beliefs, however, have suggested that benefits 
mythbusting is likely to fail. Repeated qualitative studies in the UK have presented people with 
factual information, and found that it is simply not believed by participants. Not all facts are rejected 
out-of-hand; a growth in housing benefit claims among working people has some resonance, for 
example (Doron & Tinker, 2013). But mythbusters that ĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐďĞůŝĞĨƐĂƌĞǁŝĚĞůǇ
rejected, particularly when they are based on statistics produced by distrusted institutions (Doron & 
Tinker, 2013; Mattinson, 2014:51). For example, one study reported that  “in cases where the 
evidence appeared to contradict their original views, participants typically dismissed the evidence as 
 ?ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƉƌŽƉĂŐĂŶĚĂ ?Žƌ ?ŶĞǁƐƉĂƉĞƌƚĂůŬ ? ?(Knight, 2015).  Similarly, an Ipsos MORI/Demos 
ƐƚƵĚǇƋƵŽƚĞĚŽŶĞƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐĂǇŝŶŐ ? “How do they get theƐĞĨŝŐƵƌĞƐƚŚĞŶ ?/ƐŝƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚ
ǁĂŶƚƉĞŽƉůĞƚŽŬŶŽǁƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŝƌƐǇƐƚĞŵŝƐƌƵďďŝƐŚĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞďĞŝŶŐĐŽŶŶĞĚ ?ĞĐĂƵƐĞǁĞ ?ƌĞ
ďĞŝŶŐĐŽŶŶĞĚĂůůŽǀĞƌƚŚĞƉůĂĐĞǁŝƚŚŝŵŵŝŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞůŽƚ ?ƐŽ/ĚŽŶ ?ƚƚŚŝŶŬ/ ?ĚƚƌƵƐƚƚŚĞĨŝŐƵƌĞƐ ? 
(Duffy et al., 2013). 
The impact of mythbusting on attitudes 
ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶŝŶďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐŵǇƚŚďƵƐƚŝŶŐŝƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂĐĂƵƐĂůůŝŶŬďĞƚǁĞĞŶƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐďĞůŝĞĨƐ
about the benefits system and their deservingness judgements. This is plausible in the light of the 
empirical literature, but with caveats. In a separate analysis (Baumberg Geiger, In Press), I show that 
beliefs about the benefits system are often strongly associated with deservingness judgements, even 
after controlling for political preferences and sociodemographic factors (education, working status, 
region, age and gender). One way of expressing this relationship is via a method that Sturgis (2003) 
ƚĞƌŵƐ ‘ƐŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƐǁŚĂƚƚŚĞƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐǁŽƵůĚďĞŝĨƚŚĞŝƌŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞǁĂƐ
uniformly correct. A selection of the simulation results from Baumberg Geiger (In Press) are shown 
below in Table 1. 
[Table 1 about here]  
For example, this shows that if people knew the correct proportion of welfare spending that was 
fraudulent  ? ƚĂŬŝŶŐ ‘ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚ ?ƚŽďĞ ? ?A?ŽĨĐůĂŝŵƐƚŽĂůůŽǁĨŽƌŚŝĚĚĞŶĨƌĂƵĚĂŶĚĂŵĂƌŐŝŶŽĨĞƌƌŽƌ ?ďƵƚ
ŶŽƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐŝƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůǇŚŝŐŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĞǆƚĞŶƐŝǀĞĨƌĂƵĚ-checking suggests  ? 
ƚŚĞŶ ? ? ?A?ĨĞǁĞƌƉĞŽƉůĞǁŽƵůĚĂŐƌĞĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂ ‘ĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐǇĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ? ?KǀĞƌĂůů ?ƚŚĞŵŽĚĞůƐ
ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚĨŽƌŵŽƐƚďĞůŝĞĨƐ ?ŝĨƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞǁĂƐĐŽƌƌĞĐƚƚŚĞŶ ?-10% fewer would agree that 
claimants are undeserving. These add up to a considerable effect for the four beliefs that are in the 
same survey  ? 73.8% believed that there was a dependency culture if they were wrong on all four 
beliefs, compared to only 35.9% for those with 3 or 4 correct answers. However, beliefs about the 
                                                          
3 See http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/7424.  
level of benefits that claimants receive, or their incentive to work, have no relationship with 
deservingness judgements, presumably depending on their connections to the particular belief 
structure held by the individual (see further discussion in Baumberg Geiger, In Press). 
Yet while people with certain beliefs hold certain attitudes, this may indicate that their attitudes 
determine their beliefs rather than vice versa. People tend to selectively expose themselves to 
information  ? and to interpret the information they do receive  ? in ways that support their existing 
attitudes, a much-ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞĚƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽŶŬŶŽǁŶĂƐ ‘ŵŽƚŝǀĂƚĞĚƌĞĂƐŽŶŝŶŐ ?(e.g. Taber et al., 2009).  
Not only does this make it difficult to convince someone to change strongly held beliefs (as above), 
but if a certain belief changes, then people may rearrange the structure of their worldview to 
continue justify their attitudes, rather than changing the attitude itself.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the experimental evidence on the impact of information on attitudes is 
mixed. Kuziemko et al (2015) found that giving people inequality-related information made them 
much more likely to agree that inequality was a serious problem and support a higher estate tax (but 
had no impact on support for other policy proposals such as a higher millionaire tax). In contrast, 
Lawrence & Sides (2014) found no impacts on policy attitudes of giving people a varied list of policy-
relevant statistics. Overall, Lawrence & Sides (2014) ?ƐĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƐĞĞŵƐƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞ P“providing 
ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĐĂŶ ?ďƵƚĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇ ?ĐŚĂŶŐĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŵŝŶĚƐĂďŽƵƚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŝƐƐƵĞƐ ? ? (It is also 
worth noting that these survey experiments are a slightly artificial design that is likely to 
overestimate the real-life, longer-term impacts of mythbusting (Barabas & Jerit, 2010)). 
When it comes to benefits beliefs, the evidence is sparse but more pessimistic. One study found that 
ƐĞǀĞƌĂůƉŝĞĐĞƐŽĨŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŚĂĚŶŽŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐƐƵƉƉŽƌt for benefits-related policies 
(Kuklinski et al., 2000) ?dŚĞh<ĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚŽŶ ‘ƚĂǆƌĞĐĞŝƉƚƐ ?ďǇĂƌŶĞƐĞƚĂůĚŝĚ ĨŝŶĚƚŚĂƚŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ
improved (see above), but without any change in attitudes. One interpretation is that mythbusters 
ĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌƐŽƵƌĐĞƐŽĨŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĐĂŶŐŝǀĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ‘ĨĂĐƚƐ ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇƚŚĞŶůĂƚĞr repeat to survey 
ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞƌƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐĂĨĂƌĐƌǇĨƌŽŵĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐǁĂǇƐŽĨƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ
would lead them to support different policies.  This would also explain why other types of 
mythbusting have been found to influence beliefs but have no effect (or even contrary effects) on 
attitudes (Nyhan & Reifler, 2015).  
A blueprint for successful mythbusting 
This does not necessarily mean that all mythbusting is doomed to failure  ? but it does provide 
several lessons(Lewandowsky et al., 2012). Firstly, disembodied facts do not help people come to a 
more accurate worldview, and it is instead better to provide mythbusting embedded within 
ĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞƐƚŽƌŝĞƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ĨŝůůƚŚĞĐŽŚĞƌĞŶĐĞŐĂƉ ?(Lewandowsky et al., 2012). This is also the conclusion 
of those who have experimented with mythbusting in Britain, who argue  “tŚĞƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů ?ƐĐƌŽƵŶŐĞƌ ?
narrative is rooted in anecdote, storieƐĂŶĚƐǇŵďŽůƐ ?ŶŽƚƐƚĂƚŝƐƚŝĐƐ ? ? (Mattinson, 2014), or more 
ƐƵĐĐŝŶĐƚůǇ ? “fŽƐƚĞƌĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĚŽŶ ?ƚũƵƐƚĚŝƐƉĞŶƐĞĨĂĐƚƐ ?(Doron & Tinker, 2013). Some 
commentators are coming to similar conclusions that  “fact-busting has its limits ? (Moore, 2013) or 
ƚŚĂƚǁĞƐŚŽƵůĚƐƚŽƉ “ďŽŵďĂƌĚŝŶŐƚŚĞĞůĞĐƚŽƌĂƚĞǁŝƚŚƐƚĂƚŝƐƚŝĐƐƚŚĂƚĚŽŶ ?ƚƌĞƐŽŶĂƚĞ ? (Jones, 2016). 
Secondly, mythbusting needs to be credible for the people it is trying to influence. One charity 
described their wider attempt at publishing a mythbusting supplement in the New Statesman 
magazine, which  “ǁĂƐǁĞůůƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĚ ? but only by people who were already well informed. There is 
ŶŽĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞƚŽĚĂƚĞƚŽƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚǁĞŚĂǀĞĐŚĂŶŐĞĚĂŶǇŽŶĞ ?ƐŵŝŶĚ ?(Knight, 2015). Rather than 
appealing to the converted, successful mythbusting  “ŵƵƐƚďĞƚĂŝůŽƌĞĚ ?to the people who need to be 
convinced,  “ƉƌĞĨĞƌĂďůǇďǇĞŶƐƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐŽƌƌĞĐƚŝŽŶŝƐĐŽŶƐŽŶĂŶƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĂƵĚŝĞŶĐĞ ?ƐǁŽƌůĚǀŝĞǁ ?
(Lewandowsky et al., 2012:120). Indeed, there is some  ? albeit suggestive rather than definitive  ? 
eǀŝĚĞŶĐĞƚŚĂƚ ‘partisan politicians who speak against their own apparent political interests ?ŵĂǇďĞ
the most effective voices of mythbusting (Berinsky, 2015). 
&ŝŶĂůůǇ ?ŵǇƚŚďƵƐƚŝŶŐŵĂǇĚŽŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶƐŝŵƉůǇĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇĐŚĂŶŐĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŵŝŶĚƐ ?EǇŚĂŶ ?ZĞŝĨůĞƌ
(2014) ƚĞƐƚŝĨĚƌĂǁŝŶŐƐƚĂƚĞůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŽƌƐ ?ĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞWƵůůŝƚǌĞƌ-ǁŝŶŶŝŶŐ ‘WŽůŝƚŝĨĂĐƚ ?ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶůĞĂĚƐ
them to make fewer claims that are later fact-checked and found to be untrue. While the numbers 
of claims that are fact-checked by Politifact is relatively small over this period and the analyses 
therefore low-powered, there is some suggestive evidence that there is an effect. Mythbusting may 
therefore contribute to a more truthful public debate, and have an indirect impact on public 
attitudes via the behaviour of elected representatives and other prominent public figures. Still, while 
well-constructed benefits mythbusting may have some value, it seems a distant hope that it will 
have a transformative effect on the publiĐ ?ƐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĂŶĚĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐŽŶďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐ ? 
Myths and deservingness judgements in other times and places 
If mythbusting is likely to fail, then British progressives may resign themselves to the impossibility of 
progressive reforms in the midst of a hostile public debate. Yet this too relies on a faulty assumption 
about the difference between contemporary Britain and other times and places in which the 
benefits system is more generous, as this section explains.  
While the evidence on benefit beliefs in other times and places is thin, the limited evidence that 
exists suggests that the public are never particularly well-informed about the benefits system. In 
Britain, Golding & Middleton (1982:174) found that an outright majority overestimated a 
ŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƚŝĐĂůĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ƐŝŶĐŽŵĞŽŶ Supplementary Benefit in 1977, though perceptions of the level of 
ƵŶĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚƐĞĞŵĞĚƚŽďĞƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůǇĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞ ?,ƵĚƐŽŶ ?>ƵŶƚ ?ƐƌĞǀŝĞǁŽĨĞǀĞŶĞĂƌůŝĞƌƐƵƌǀĞǇ
data (this volume) finds that understanding of the famous Beveridge Report in 1942 was limited. 
There is no comparative data on benefits beliefs across countries, but Scandinavians similarly have 
imperfect knowledge of their unemployment and long-term sickness rates, with only around half of 
respondents managing to provide a roughly correct answer (see Appendices to Baumberg Geiger, In 
Press). 
As a further step, we can compare perceptions of the value of benefits in Belgium vs. the UK, based 
on two sets of similar questions in the 2014 Belgian National Election Study (Swyngedouw et al., 
2014) 4 and the UK studies reviewed in Baumberg Geiger (submitted): 5 
- Approach 1: these surveys firstly ask if a single benefit claimant has enough to live on (UK) or 
whether their benefits are too high/low (Belgium). Respondents are then asked this again 
after hearing the actual amount of the benefit; if people become more generous then this 
implies that they overestimated the real benefit level. In Britain, 24% overestimate the 
benefit and 13% underestimate it (52% not changing their view when given the true figure), 
whereas in Belgium, 33% overestimate the benefit and 12% underestimate it.  
- Approach 2: the surveys also ask directly for the estimated value of benefits received by a 
couple (UK) or a single person (Belgium). Taking correct responses to be those within a 
ǁŝŶĚŽǁŽĨ ? ? ? ?Ɖǁ ?h< ?Žƌ ? ? ? ? ?ƉĐŵ ?ĞůŐŝƵŵ ?ĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞƚƌ ĞǀĂůƵĞ ? ? ?A?ŐŝǀĞ
underestimates and 50% overestimates in the UK, whereas in Belgium 26% give 
overestimates and 45% overestimates. 
While there are some further differences between the surveys that make exact comparisons 
difficult,6 benefit beliefs seem to be about as inaccurate in both countries  ? something which is 
further supported by the similar inaccuracy of Belgians and Britons in estimating levels of 
unemployment and long-term sickness (see Appendices to Baumberg Geiger, In Press). Accurate 
benefits beliefs are clearly not a precondition of the more positive benefits attitudes in Belgium (see 
Figure 2).  
Moreover, even at the moments in history where the benefits system was being expanded, hostile 
attitudes to some groups of claimants existed. For example, in the midst of the US New Deal, there 
ǁĂƐ “far more skepticism and outright hostility towards the safety net than our admiring view of the 
policy history would suggest ? (Newman & Jacobs, 2008). Hudson & Lunt (this volume) likewise find 
                                                          
4 This post-electoral study was carried out among a register-based probability sample of Belgians entitled to vote 
in the 2014 elections. The study consists of two surveys: a face-to-face survey (response rate 47%), and a follow-
up questionnaire to return via mail (which 74% of the initial respondents did, leading to a sample size of 1403). 
The questions are as follows: 
-  “WĞŽƉůĞǁŚŽĚŽŶŽƚŚĂǀĞƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚŵĞĂŶƐŽĨƐƵďƐŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŝŶĞůŐŝƵŵĐĂŶŽďƚĂŝŶƐŽĐŝĂůĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ  from 
the OCMW. [Follow-up questionnaire only: In the case of a single person, the social assistance benefit is 
currently 817 Euro per month]. ŽǇŽƵƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĂƚĂŵŽƵŶƚŝƐƚŽŽŚŝŐŚŽƌƚŽŽůŽǁ ? ?Answer categories: 1 
(Much too high)  ? 5 (Much too low) 
-  “WĞŽƉůĞ who do not have sufficient means of subsistence in Belgium can obtain social assistance from 
the OCMW. There are few people who know exactly how much the social assistance benefit is. Expressed 
in euros, how high do you estimate the social assistance benefit is for someone who lives alone? You 
ĐĂŶĂůǁĂǇƐŐƵĞƐƐǁŚĞŶǇŽƵĚŽŶŽƚŬŶŽǁƚŚĞĐŽƌƌĞĐƚĂŵŽƵŶƚ ? ?
Both questions were originally given in the face-to-face survey; in order to avoid memory effects, the question 
giving true value of benefit in question 1 was given in the follow-up survey. 
5 The UK questions are given in Baumberg Geiger (submitted), Table 3 (for approach 1) and Table 1 (for 
approach 2).  
6 The main differences are: (i) the Belgian questions refer to a benefit including housing costs (as there is no 
separate housing benefit), whereas the UK questions explicitly exclude housing costs; (ii) for approach 1, the 
Belgian questions are asked in two separate surveys (the follow-up question being asked in a self-completion 
survey after the interview), whereas the British questions are asked directly following one another; and (iii) the 
claimant types are different between countries for approach 2. 
such attitudes in the postwar consensus of 1960s Britain; for example, they show that large 
majorities agreed ƚŚĂƚ ‘ŵĂŶǇƉĞŽƉůĞĂƌĞĚƌĂǁŝŶŐƐƵƉƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƌǇďĞŶĞĨŝƚ ?ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞǁŚŽ
ĐŽƵůĚƌĞĂůůǇďĞĞĂƌŶŝŶŐĞŶŽƵŐŚƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐŝĨƚŚĞǇǁĂŶƚĞĚƚŽ ? ?The same is true in the 
relatively generous systems of present-day Scandinavia. For example, 68-73% of people in 
Scandinavian countries say that people often look down on social assistance claimants (Albrekt 
Larsen, 2006:Table 6.2), while 29-43% of Scandinavians agree that social benefits/services make 
people lazy, and 32-51% agree that many people manage to obtain benefits/services that they are 
not entitled to.7 
In fact, if we look across European countries, the perception of negative economic and moral 
consequences is higher in those countries that have higher social expenditures (van Oorschot et al., 
2012:192). The perception of negative consequences across each country in the ESS is shown below 
in Figure 2, and highlights that the Scandinavian countries are unexceptional in their perception of 
negative consequences; it is clearly not the case such attitudes present an insurmountable barrier to 
more generous welfare states.  What van Oorschot et al make clear, however, is that the perception 
of positive consequences of the welfare state  ? preventing widespread poverty, creating a more 
equal society, and helping people combine work and family  ? is higher still in these countries. As 
they put it,  “ĂŚŝŐŚĞƌƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐǁĞůĨĂƌĞƐƚĂƚĞƉƌŽŵŽƚĞƐŝƚƐƐŽĐŝĂůůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇďǇƐƚŝŵƵůĂƚŝŶŐŝŶƉĞŽƉůĞ
the idea that it is doing a good job, more than that it arouses their worries about its effect on the 
ĞĐŽŶŽŵǇĂŶĚŵŽƌĂůƐ ? ? 
[Figure 2 about here] 
Again, it is important to be clear on my argument here. I am not claiming that negative attitudes 
towards benefits are equally high in Scandinavian countries as the UK, as Figure 2 makes clear 
(indeed, the same ESS data shows that far more Britons think that social benefits/services make 
people lazy). Nor am I claiming that Scandinavian perceptions of their benefits system are as 
erroneous as British perceptions (Britons perceive higher levels of unemployment and long-term 
sickness compared to Swedes, for example, despite Sweden having higher levels of both; Baumberg 
Geiger, In Press). Instead, I want to argue that myths and perceptions of undeservingness are not 
unique to the UK, and can be found even in times and places in which the benefits system is much 
more generous. What is different in such settings is not whether such ideas exist to any great extent 
in society, but how widespread they are, and how far they are balanced by widespread perceptions 
of more positive consequences of the welfare state.  
The ambivalence of benefits attitudes  
What characterises attitudes to the benefits system, above all, is ambivalence. This seems to be true 
of all countries at all times  ? even when the benefits system is generous and popular, many people 
still have some concerns, as the previous section has shown. The same is true in reverse for 21st 
century Britain: even though attitudes are usually felt to be predominantly hostile, many people 
have positive elements to their attitudes to the benefits system. For example, when last asked (in 
 ? ? ? ? ? ?ŽǀĞƌŚĂůĨŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞƐĂŝĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞƉƌŽƵĚŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƐŽĐŝĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ĂŶĚŶŽƚũƵƐƚ
proud about the welfare state in general). Nearly 80% of respondents agree that large numbers who 
                                                          
7 Authors own analysis of weighted ESS data 2008. 
are eligible for benefits fail to claim them (both from BSA data in Baumberg et al., 2012:17). And 
there is relatively widespread agreement in the ESS data in the previous section that the benefits 
system has positive consequences in preventing widespread poverty (57%) and helping people 
combine work and family (58%). 
Another way of expressing this ambivalence is to look within a single country at how far groups 
perceived to be deserving are supported compared to groups perceived to be undeserving. In the UK 
in 2013, far more people thought there should be less spending on unemployment benefits than 
though that spending should rise (49% less vs. 15% more). Yet the same respondents also 
overwhelmingly thought there should be more spending on disabled people who cannot work (4% 
less, 54% more) (Baumberg, 2014:9). This has visible impacts on political debate, most recently with 
the (right-ǁŝŶŐ ?'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽĐƵƚĂ ?ŶŽŶ-work-related) disability benefit by tightening 
the eligibility criteria. This faced overwhelming public disagreement (two polls at the time put 
opposition to the policy at 70% and 84%)8 and seems to have been scrapped in the light of a 
backbench rebellion and the (partially-attributable) resignation of the Secretary of State (against 
what he argued to be a policy imposed by the Treasury).9 
Such differentiation according to deservingness judgements is by no means limited to the UK; 
indeed, Wim van Oorschot has influentially argued that there is a universal ranking of different 
claimant groups from most deserving to least deserving (van Oorschot, 2006). Aarøe & Petersen 
(2014) ŚĂǀĞůŝŬĞǁŝƐĞĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚďŽƚŚŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƐĂŶĚĂŶĞƐƐŚŽǁĂƐŝŵŝůĂƌ ‘ĚĞƐĞƌǀŝŶŐŶĞƐƐŚĞƵƌŝƐƚŝĐ ? ?
with citizens of both countries making similar judgements about whether hypothetical claimants are 
worthy of support when given a clear sign about their motivation to work. It is only when people are 
asked to form an opinion about benefits claimants in the absence of clear deservingness clues that 
the expected US-Denmark differences are visible. 
The challenge in the UK is therefore not that negative attitudes exist, nor that there is little support 
for claimants who are seen to be undeserving, nor even that there is ambivalence about the benefits 
system  ? for all of these are universal. Rather, the challenge is that public debate about benefits 
emphasises the negative side of this ambivalence at the expense of the positive side, and 
emphasises undeserving claimants over deserving ones. Hence in Figure 2, the balance of positive vs. 
negative perceived consequences of the welfare state is higher in the Scandinavian countries than 
nearly every other European country, while the UK in contrast has the most negative perceived 
balance of any country barring Slovakia and Hungary (van Oorschot et al., 2012:188). This is reflected 
in media coverage: stories about benefits in Britain are split between the positive and negative, 
while stories in the Scandinavian press are usually positive (Larsen & Dejgaard, 2013). 
Conclusion  
In this article, I have argued that some of the concerns of British progressives about how to respond 
to myths and harsh benefit attitudes are misplaced. It is true that many benefit myths are 
                                                          
8 See the YouGov poll 16-17 March at https://yougov.co.uk/news/2016/03/18/least-fair-budget-
omnishambles/ and the Ipsos MORI poll 19-22/3/2016 at https://www.ipsos-
mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/3713/George-Osbornes-satisfaction-ratings-equal-his-worst-
ever-following-budget.aspx#gallery[m]/2/  
9 See http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-35848687  
widespread in Britain, and that claimants are perceived more harshly than twenty or thirty years ago 
 ? and there are also some signs that these myths and harsh attitudes are linked. However, it is 
ĚŽƵďƚĨƵůƚŚĂƚ ‘ŵǇƚŚďƵƐƚŝŶŐ ?ǁŝůůŚĂǀĞůĂƌŐĞŝŵƉĂĐƚƐŽŶĞŝƚŚĞƌŽĨƚŚĞŵ ?DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ?ŝƚŝƐŶŽƚĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚ
progressive benefits system reforms depend on wiping out either myths or perceived 
undeservingness, as these can be found in more generous benefit systems ranging from post-war 
Britain to present-day Scandinavia. At the population level, people are fundamentally ambivalent 
about benefits systems, and what is critical is the balance between the positive and negative aspects 
of this ambivalence. This is a different starting point than most current debates on benefits in 
Britain, but one that is borne out by the evidence, and takes the debates in a different direction. 
This obviously leaves the question of how to influence this balance  ? but to avoid repeating an 
argument I have previously made in this journal, I will only summarise this briefly here (for a fuller 
argument, see Baumberg, 2012). The cornerstones of debates about benefits are often set by the 
ďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐƐǇƐƚĞŵŝƚƐĞůĨ PƐŽŵĞƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ ‘ŽƉĞŶƵƉ ?ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĚĞƐĞƌǀŝŶŐŶĞƐƐ ?ǁŚŝůĞŽƚŚĞƌƐĐůŽƐĞƚŚĞŵ
down (Albrekt Larsen, 2006) ?dŚŝƐƐƚŝůůůĞĂǀĞƐƐŽŵĞƐƉĂĐĞƚŽ ‘ƌĞĨƌĂŵĞ ?ĚĞďĂƚĞƐƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞ
reforms (Lakoff, 2014) ?ďƵƚƚŚĞƐĞŶĞĞĚƚŽƌĞƐŽŶĂƚĞǁŝƚŚƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐďĞůŝ ĨƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞŝŶƚƵƌŶ
partly structured by the present system. While it is therefore impossible to take progressive leaps at 
first, it may be easier to take a series of small steps that successively unlock the possibility of 
hitherto impossible changes. This is something that Conservative politicians have appreciated (albeit 
with opposing aims), setting in motion reforms in the 1980s that change public preferences and 
political possibilities in the 2010s. As Margaret Thatcher once said,  “ŝƚŝƐŶ ?ƚƚŚĂƚ/ƐĞƚŽƵƚŽŶĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ
ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ?ĐŽŶomics are the method; the object is to change the heart and soul ?(Thatcher, 1981).  
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Table 1: Simulated population-level deservingness perceptions if people 








PERCEPTIONS OF BENEFIT FRAUD     
Fraud as % of welfare spending (1) Dependency culture -8.1%** 
PERCEPTIONS OF SPENDING ON BENEFITS   
Unemp as % of welfare budget Dependency culture -11.4%** 
PERCEPTIONS OF LEVEL OF CLAIMS AMONG WORKING-AGE POPULATION   
Long-term sick & disabled as % of pop Many not entitled -7.4%** 
Unemployed & looking for work as % of pop Many not entitled -6.5%** 
PERCEPTIONS OF VALUE OF BENEFITS   
£ unemp benefit, couple+2 kids (1) Dependency culture 0.0% 
 ?ŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞƚŽƚĂŬĞŵŝŶǁĂŐĞũŽď ? Dependency culture 0.3% 
Table adapted from Baumberg Geiger (In Press). Key: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10;  ?DĂũŽƌŝƐƐƵĞƐ
around the 'true' figure given, (1) Minor issues about the 'true value' given. Models control for sex, 
age, age2, region, education, economic activity, and political affiliation (see Baumberg Geiger, In 
Press for further details). 
  
Figure 1: Trends in benefit attitudes in Britain since 1983 
 
Source: British Social Attitudes survey (see Baumberg, 2014 for further details) 
  
Figure 2: Perceived positive and negative consequences of the welfare 
state across Europe 
 
Adapted from van Oorschot et al (2012). Data are own analyse of ESS 2008 data; bars show the 
average share of the population agreeing that social benefits/services have each of five negative 
consequences (darker bars; items are placing too great a strain on the economy, costing businesses 
too much in taxes/charges, making people lazy, making people less willing to care for one another, 
making people less willing to look after themselves/family) and each of three positive consequences 
(lighter bars; items are preventing widespread poverty, leading to a more equal society, making it 
easier to combine work & family).  
 
 
